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THE CONSEQUENCES OF CITIZENS UNITED: WHAT DO THE
LAWYERS SAY?
ANN SOUTHWORTH*

I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers lawyers’ perspectives on the consequences of one
of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions of our time—Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 1 a 5–4 decision overturning limits
on corporate and union expenditures in federal elections. Drawing on
confidential interviews with thirty-one lawyers who participated in the case
as counsel for parties and amici, 2 it explores what the lawyers say about how
the decision has affected the political process.
Why should we care about the views of these lawyers? As evidence of
how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United actually has affected the
political process, there are good reasons to be cautious. The lawyers may be
deeply committed to arguments they made in briefs and unwilling to concede
valid counterarguments. Their commentary may also reflect their ongoing
efforts to influence the debate. On the other hand, many of these lawyers are
close observers of how Citizens United has played out on the ground, and
their reflections offer a useful complement to opinions expressed by
scholars, politicians, advocacy groups, and ordinary citizens. 3 The fact that
lawyers on both sides largely agree about the short-term consequences of

* Professor and Founding Faculty Member, University of California, Irvine School of Law. I am indebted
to the lawyers who allowed me to interview them for this research and sacrificed their valuable time to
help me understand their work and perspectives. I am also grateful to Rick Hasen and Bryant Garth, who
commented on an earlier draft.
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. I have thus far conducted fifty-two interviews with lawyers who have been active on campaign
finance regulatory issues since 2006, when John Roberts became Chief Justice. This Essay draws
primarily from interviews with the thirty-one lawyers who filed briefs on behalf of parties or amici in
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Of those thirty-one lawyers, fifteen filed briefs on the side of the
Federal Election Commission, and sixteen filed briefs on the side of Citizens United.
3. For some data on those other perspectives, see Albert W. Alschuler et al., Why Limits on
Contributions to Super PACS Should Survive Citizens United, (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Papers Series, Paper No. 626, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015462
[https://perma.cc/ZG6Z-YDRW].
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Citizens United also provides some assurance about the reliability of their
views on that topic.
These lawyers’ perspectives about the consequences of Citizens United
may also be worth considering for reasons having nothing to do with their
accuracy or truthfulness. Lawyers’ ideas and rhetoric play an important part
in constitutional interpretation and constitutional change in the United
States. 4 Even if Supreme Court Justices are the ultimate arbiters of
constitutional questions that come before the Court, they nevertheless rely
on lawyers to supply arguments to explain, support, and defend their
decisions. 5 Lawyers are also part of the “audience” for judicial decisionmaking—those whose approval the Justices care about and who hold them
accountable. 6 Lawyers’ selection of frames sometimes influence judicial
outcomes 7 and shape perceptions in other important arenas of contest over
constitutional interpretation, including the media and popular opinion. 8 Their
commentary may also reveal something about interests potentially affected
and about popular attitudes and legal consciousness, since lawyers serve as
intermediaries, translating laypersons’ claims and perspectives into legal
language 9 and interpreting the Court’s opinions for the public. 10 As Jack
Balkin has suggested, lawyers are influenced by the “larger public culture—
and subcultures—in which [they] live,” and they also shape those
subcultures. 11 In short, lawyers’ commentary on the consequences of
4. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 86–91 (2011).
5. See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND
THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 12 (2015); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC SWEET, ON LAW,
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002).
6. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (2006); Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010).
7. See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE:
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 307 (1992); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW
SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009); Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court Litigants
and Strategic Framing, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617 (2010).
8. See generally Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111
MICH. L. REV. 877 (2013) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 4) [hereinafter NeJaime, Constitutional
Change]; Douglas NeJaime, Framing (In)Equality for Same-Sex Couples, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
184 (2013); Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Rethinking the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201 (2013); Cf. DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN
ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225 (2016) (arguing that “framing and messaging are as
essential to a constitutional campaign as formal legal argument”).
9. NeJaime, Constitutional Change, supra note 8, at 895; BALKIN, supra note 4, at 238.
10. Cf. Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1028–34 (2016) (noting
the easy availability of Supreme Court opinions through social media but observing that most readers of
the opinions are lawyers and that the public’s response is likely shaped by how those lawyers and public
officials, movement leaders, public intellectuals, and others respond).
11. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 16 (“Lawyers . . . soak up conceptions of what is just and reasonable
from their society, and from the subcultures they inhabit, as a tree soaks up water through its roots.
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Citizens United provides a window into how they seek to influence
constitutional politics through their work, and it may also reveal something
about how their clients and the constituencies they claim to serve understand
the issues, even if the direction of influence is unclear.
This Essay explores a polarized world of advocacy around campaign
finance regulation. 12 Part II briefly summarizes the facts and holding of
Citizens United and the deeply divided perspectives of the Justices on what
was at stake in the case. Part III considers the views of lawyers who sided
with the Federal Election Commission, and Part IV describes the
perspectives of lawyers on the challengers’ side. Part V highlights the
primary points of consensus and discord, showing that the lawyers generally
agree about the direct consequences of Citizens United but strongly disagree
about the broader implications and what lessons the public should draw. It
explores the competing frames that lawyers bring to campaign finance
regulation and fundamental differences in their attitudes about where the
greatest threats to representative democracy lie. As one lawyer noted,
“[t]here’s this amazing dichotomy between [the] two worldviews.” 13
I use the term “defenders” throughout this Essay to describe the lawyers
who championed the legal restrictions invalidated in Citizens United and
“challengers” to refer to lawyers who urged the Court to strike down these
limitations on First Amendment grounds.
II. THE CITIZENS UNITED DECISION
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission involved a
conservative political action committee’s plan to air on cable television a
movie that was highly critical of Democratic presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton. The group had already distributed the film on DVD and in theaters,
but it wanted to use treasury funds to make it available as a free download to

Conversely, they also influence non-professionals through their work in shaping official law.”); cf.
ROBERT W. GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW 277–78
(2017) (noting that “mandarin materials” produced by lawyers and judges “are among the richest artifacts
of a society’s legal consciousness”; that there are likely to be “trickle-down effects” from elites to other
elements of society, as well as “refracted trickle-up effects” to lawyers and judges from “a consciousness
whose primary producers are to the found all over the society”).
12. This Essay does not attempt to capture the lawyers’ views about the process that led to the
ruling in Citizens United, the breadth of the holding, the quality of the Court’s analysis, and its use of
precedent. Nor does it consider their perspectives on other major campaign finance decisions of the
Roberts Court and the jurisprudential legacy on which they build. I will address those questions and others
in a forthcoming book on the lawyers, organizations and patrons on both sides of campaign finance
litigation in the Roberts Court and their roles in generating and promoting competing understandings of
the relationship between the First Amendment and money in politics.
13. Confidential Interview 14.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3137211

THECONSEQUENCESOFCITIZENSUNITED4818-UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

104

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

4/10/2018 8:27 AM

[Vol 93:2

cable subscribers. Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 14
(BCRA, also known as McCain–Feingold) prohibited corporations and
unions from using money from their general treasuries to fund
“electioneering communications,” defined as “any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office” and is made within sixty days before a general election or
thirty days before a primary election.15 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled that section 203 prevented Citizens United
from using treasury funds to distribute the movie within thirty days of the
2008 Democratic primaries. Citizens United still could have paid for the ads
and distribution through its political action committee, and it could have used
its general treasury funds for this purpose if it had declined to take money
from for-profit corporations.
The Supreme Court heard the case in March 2009 but did not decide the
case that term. Rather, in a highly unusual move, it called for supplemental
briefing and a second oral argument early in the following term on whether
the Court should find section 203 unconstitutional and upset two precedents.
In January 2010, the Supreme Court invalidated section 203 and held that
corporations—and, by extension, labor unions—have a First Amendment
right to spend unlimited amounts independently to support or oppose
candidates for public office. It found that corporations should not “be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because [they] are not ‘natural
persons.’” 16 The Court further determined that campaign expenditures could
not be regulated for the purpose of limiting access and influence; the only
basis for restricting corporate expenditure was to prevent quid pro quo
corruption—a direct exchange of money for political favors, and the Court
found that the government could not prove that independent expenditures
could lead to such corruption or the appearance of corruption. The decision
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 17 which upheld a
Michigan statute limiting the amount that corporations could spend to
support or oppose candidates in elections for state office. It also partially
overruled McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 18 which upheld the
very provision of the BCRA that the Court found unconstitutional in Citizens
United. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002).
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).
558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010).
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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Justice Stevens wrote a passionate dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor. Stevens’s dissenting opinion criticized the majority
for overturning Austin and parts of McConnell when it could instead have
ruled in Citizens United’s favor on narrower grounds. 19 He rejected the
majority’s claim that corporations hold the same right to spend money in
elections as natural persons. 20 He also took strong issue with the majority’s
assertion that the only justification for regulating campaign expenditures is
to avoid quid pro quo corruption. 21 He asserted that this “crabbed view of
corruption” 22 “disregards our constitutional history and the fundamental
demands of a democratic society.” 23
The equation of election spending with speech and the corruption
rationale for evaluating the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations
date back to the Supreme Court’s 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo. 24
Buckley upheld contribution limits and disclosure requirements imposed by
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974 (FECA),
but struck down limits on campaign spending. The Court found that political
contributions and expenditures implicated core political speech 25 and that
19. The dissenters argued that the Court could have decided that a feature-length film distributed
through video-on-demand to willing viewers does not qualify as an “electioneering communication”
under § 203 of BCRA, or that Citizens United was entitled to a media exemption to the spending rules,
or that § 203 was unconstitutional as applied to Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation that accepted
only de minimis contributions from for-profit corporations. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 405–08 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. The dissent took strong issue with the Court’s critique of identity-based distinctions:
The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of
the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s
identity, including its “identity” as a corporation. . . . The conceit that corporations must be
treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also
inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case.
Id. at 394.
21. Id. at 313.
22. Id. at 447 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152).
23. Id.
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25. Here is some of the key language from Buckley on the relationship between speech and election
spending:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society
requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails
printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall
and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other
mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication
indispensable instruments of effective political speech.
The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather than merely
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. . . .
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campaign finance regulations were consistent with the First Amendment’s
free speech and association guarantees only if they could be justified in terms
of the government’s interest in preventing “corruption” or “the appearance
of corruption.” 26 Without precisely defining those terms, 27 it found that the
interest in preventing the reality and appearance of corruption was a
constitutionally-sufficient justification for the contribution limit because
contributions could corrupt politicians, but that it did not justify the
limitations on independent expenditures, which could not. 28 The Buckley
Court rejected alternative rationales for campaign spending limits based in
arguments about the government’s interest in promoting political equality. 29
In Citizens United, the majority and dissent painted starkly different
pictures of the competing stakes. The majority equated campaign spending
with political speech and asserted that protecting such speech, from whatever
source, is a foundational principle enshrined in the First Amendment. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion expressed outrage about section 203’s purposes:
“[U]nder our law and our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our
Government to make . . . political speech a crime. Yet this is the statute’s
purpose and design.” 30 The majority invoked the word “speech” and its
variations 270 times, twice as often as the dissent, and it used the word “ban”
forty-two times to characterize the statute’s requirement that any corporate
expenditures on electioneering must come from PACs rather than general
treasury funds.
Justice Stevens’s dissent took strong issue with the majority’s finding
that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political
sphere. 31 Stevens wrote that the Court’s ruling was “profoundly misguided”
and “threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon
the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication.
Id. at 19–20.
In his partial dissent, Justice Byron White rejected the majority’s equation of political spending
and speech: “[T]he argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker
violates the First Amendment proves entirely too much.” Id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 26–27 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 27–28 (“[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.”).
28. Id. at 26, 45.
29. Id. at 48–49 (concluding that the idea that the government “may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment”).
30. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Nation.” 32 His opinion also complained about the majority’s emphasis on the
specter of government suppression of dissent: “Pervading the Court’s
analysis is the ominous image of a ‘categorical ba[n]’ on corporate speech.
Indeed, the majority invokes the specter of a ‘ban’ on nearly every page of
its opinion. This characterization is highly misleading . . . .” 33
In his book on campaign finance and the Constitution, Robert Post
characterized the strong disagreements between the majority and dissent in
Citizens United as a “horrifying disjunction.” 34 He observed that the two
sides “seemed to inhabit entirely different constitutional universes,”
reflecting “a country divided, not united.” 35 My research suggests that
lawyers active on campaign finance issues, like the Justices they seek to
persuade, inhabit different constitutional universes. As they battle to shape
the law and public policy through the courts, legislatures, and agencies, and
as they compete to shape public opinion through the media, these lawyers
project radically different visions of the First Amendment and its
relationship to money in politics.
III. THE DEFENDERS’ VIEWS
The fifteen defenders whose views I summarize here were
overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, Democrats who attended elite law
schools and worked in major metropolitan areas, mostly in D.C. and the

32. Id. at 394, 396.
33. Id. at 415 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
34. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4
(2014).
35. Id. The ideological divide among the Justices on campaign finance regulation is not new.
Writing about Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), Robert Mutch noted “the
‘unbridgeable ideological gulf’ between the majority and dissenting opinions.” ROBERT E. MUTCH,
BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 160 (2014). In 2007, Lillian BeVier, a
strong opponent of campaign finance regulation, wrote:
There is little hope for reconciliation of the competing views of the current majority and
the dissenters. Their disagreement is far more fundamental than a simple dispute about
doctrine. . . . The problem . . . is that the justices do not reason from the same premises, either
as a matter of First Amendment principle or as a matter of the empirical assumptions that drive
their respective analyses. They assess the worth of political freedom differently. They entertain
wildly divergent assessments of the need for legislation to ‘‘promote democracy.’’ And they
hold entirely disparate views about either the possibility that legislation can actually effectuate
genuine improvement or the reliability of the elected officeholders who claim to have acted as
guardians of the interests of those who seek to have them voted out of office. . . .
. . . Compromise on such matters is not in the cards.
Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 77, 112–13.
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Northeast. In these respects, the defenders’ characteristics reflect those of the
larger category of all lawyers who filed briefs on the FEC’s side in the case.36
Not all of the defenders were particularly troubled that the plaintiff,
Citizens United, prevailed; several noted that they would not have been
shocked or particularly concerned if the Court had ruled in Citizens United’s
favor on narrower grounds. But they all disapproved of the holding’s
breadth, the Court’s finding that commercial corporations have the same
First Amendment rights as ordinary individuals to spend on elections, and
the opinion’s narrow definition of corruption.
Defenders decried the Supreme Court’s “activism” in finding section
203 of the BCRA unconstitutional and overruling Austin and parts of
McConnell. One defender grumbled that “[t]he Supreme Court majority won
the case that they brought . . . and the process of this case was awful. We
were not allowed to build any kind of record.” 37 Another said of the Court’s
dismantling of key features of existing campaign finance law in Citizens
United: “They did it, in my view, in a completely sort of lawless way,
untethered to the precedent and untethered to the facts.” 38
Defenders also uniformly rejected the idea that commercial
corporations should hold the same rights to political expression as individual
persons. This comment was typical:
I think that government can appropriately . . . limit participation in politics
to human beings, which would include organizations of human beings that
I don’t think needs to include entities that are created for economic
purposes to amass wealth as participants in a market economy. I don’t
think they need to be privileged with the ability to deploy that as if they
were flesh and blood people, or even coalitions or sort of membership
groups of flesh and blood people. I think that the idea that a corporation
that is organized to be in business is for First Amendment purposes
indistinguishable from a human being is not correct. And I think one area
where it’s legitimate to treat them differently is in political participation. 39

Another lawyer reached the same conclusion but more directly anchored his
argument in the Constitution’s text and history, which, he said, require us to
recognize “this fundamental divide between living, breathing persons who
the Declaration tells us were created and given unalienable human rights,
36. See Ann Southworth, Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in
the Roberts Court, LAW & SOC. INQ. 1, 18–20 (2017) (finding that eighty-one percent of the fifty-four
lawyers who filed party or amicus briefs on the FEC’s side in Citizens United worked in D.C. or the
Northeast, and eighty-seven percent attended law schools ranked in the top twenty by U.S News & World
Report).
37. Confidential Interview 18.
38. Confidential Interview 22.
39. Confidential Interview 34.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3137211

THECONSEQUENCESOFCITIZENSUNITED4818-UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/10/2018 8:27 AM

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CITIZENS UNITED

109

and corporations who were created to power the economy but with a
recognition that they would be subject to regulation to ensure that they didn’t
abuse their special privileges.” 40
Regarding the definition of corruption used in Citizens United, lawyers
complained about both process and substance. One strongly denied that the
definition followed from the cited precedents: “[A]ll the cases between
Buckley and Citizens United said the same thing. They talked about undue
influence and access. They didn’t just talk about quid pro quo corruption.
It’s just a lie. But once you write it once with five votes, there it is, it’s the
law of the land.” 41 Another complained that “the Roberts Court . . . has so
narrowed and eviscerated the meaning of corruption that it almost no longer
provides any platform to stand on in terms of justifying regulation of money
in politics. And that narrow corruption frame, in my view, doesn’t speak to
the deepest values that we need to talk about in defending the regulation of
money in politics.” 42 Another defender observed that
[t]he corruption rationale, the definition of corruption, prior to Citizens
United was bad enough and it’s a cramped framework but, at least the
courts had managed to bend and stretch it to mean so many different
things. But now that it’s limited to quid pro quo corruption, it’s absurdly
narrow. 43

One lawyer warned that “we’re really knocking on the door of just turning
[the definition] into bribery. I think that’s a harmful development.” 44
The defenders generally conceded that Citizens United has not
unleashed a wave of massive for-profit corporate spending in elections, as
some of the decision’s critics had predicted at the time of the decision. 45 One
defender acknowledged that the consequences have been less momentous
than expected:

40. Confidential Interview 7.
41. Confidential Interview 22.
42. Confidential Interview 23.
43. Confidential Interview 47.
44. Confidential Interview 4.
45. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html [http://perma.cc/MY99-SW4U] (“With a
single, disastrous 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court has thrust politics back to the robber-baron era of the
19th century. Disingenuously waving the flag of the First Amendment, the court’s conservative majority
has paved the way for corporations to use their vast treasuries to overwhelm elections and intimidate
elected officials into doing their bidding.”); Editorial, Corporate Money in Politics, WASH. POST (May
9,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/08/AR2010050803134_pf.html [https://perma.cc/6FQM-C4WB] (“The
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Citizens United campaign finance case opened a dangerous pathway for
corporations to spend money in direct support of—or in opposition to—candidates for federal office.”).
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Are we down to the political process that was essentially dominated by
unlimited corporate spending? That’s not actually what happened. You’re
not seeing . . . . And I’m not saying it never will happen. . . But you’re not
seeing Mobil Oil or JP Morgan or Pepsi Cola or whatever suddenly
pumping vast amounts of money into independent expenditures to
influence the outcome of elections. . . So I think, in that sense, it may be,
in the short term at least, not knowing what’s going to happen next, less
significant than people thought. 46

Another defender asserted that while “you don't see business corporations
doing a tremendous amount of political spending in their own names”
because they do not perceive that it’s an effective strategy, “there's still a
direct effect of non-profit corporations that receive large amounts of
corporate funding, engaging now directly in political speech that would not
have been permissible prior to Citizen's United.” 47 He noted that one of the
Roberts Court’s previous rulings, Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 48 had already found that BCRA’s limitations on corporate
electioneering were unconstitutional as applied to issue advocacy—that they
were permissible only as to “express advocacy or its functional
equivalent.” 49 But Citizens United eliminated the need to distinguish
between issue and express advocacy: “So the Chamber of Commerce now
no longer has to worry about whether its advocacy crosses the line. I mean,
[Wisconsin Right to Life] had already allowed them to engage in non-express
advocacy. Now they don't even have to worry.” 50
Some defenders emphasized that it was never their primary concern that
business corporations would pour money directly into election campaigns.
One said:
We weren’t that concerned that Chevron and Exxon and McDonald’s and
Wendy’s and Pepsi and Coke were going to jump into elections and spend
a bunch of money . . . . We didn’t think that would happen because
generally businesses don’t want their names explicitly associated with
partisan politics because it alienates huge sections of their consumer
base. 51
46. Confidential Interview 12.
47. Confidential Interview 34.
48. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
49. Id. at 465.
50. Confidential Interview 34.
51. Confidential Interview 10. For an example of consumer backlash triggered by a business’s
political contribution, consider the response to Target’s contribution to a business group that supported
Republican Tom Emmer’s campaign for Minnesota governor. Emmer was a prominent opponent of samesex marriage. See Josh Duboff, Target Issues Apology After Donation to Anti-Gay, Conservative
Republican,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Aug.
5,
2010,
9:30
PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2010/08/target_issues_apology_after_do.html
[https://perma.cc/LZP6-RVHE].
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Rather, defenders worried that corporations and their owners would channel
corporate money into nonprofit groups that do not disclose their donors:
“What we were concerned about is that 501(c)(4) corporations like the
plaintiffs, Citizens United, would be free to serve as conduits for business
community money and evade disclosure, and that’s exactly what has
unfolded.” 52
Some defenders also predicted that for-profit corporations would
become increasingly willing to devote substantial amounts of money to
influence elections in the wake of Citizens United. One said that the
individual business owners, or business owners coordinating through PACs,
now handle political spending that serves their business interests:
“Corporations themselves, I don’t think, have poured a great deal of money
in. But then they don’t have to. . . It’s the rich guys that own them.” 53 But
this lawyer asserted that corporations would get more directly into the game
when they concluded that the strategy would benefit them: “There’s a slight
inhibition now, and the inhibition now is because General Motors doesn’t
want to sell Democratic cars and Ford doesn’t want to sell Republican
cars. . . But there will come settings in which the stakes are such that they
won’t hold back.” 54
Several defenders claimed that one of the worst consequences of
Citizens United is an indirect one—the large amount of money now
contributed to “independent-expenditure only committees,” more commonly
known as Super PACs. In SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election
Commission, 55 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that limits on
contributions to Super PACs are unconstitutional; it struck down a federal
statute that limited such contributions to $5000 per year. 56 The court based
its reasoning on language in Citizens United indicating that corporations
could make unlimited independent expenditures because independent
expenditures are not corrupting. 57 SpeechNow held that “[i]n light of the
Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not
corrupt or create the appearance of . . . corruption, contributions to groups
that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the

52. Confidential Interview 10.
53. Confidential Interview 28.
54. Id.
55. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
56. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (2016).
57. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“[W]e now conclude that independent
expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”).
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appearance of corruption.” 58 Super PACs can now raise unlimited funds
from individuals, corporations, unions, nonprofits, and other sources.
In the years since SpeechNow, Super PACs have flourished and
multiplied. Super PAC spending increased from $609 million in the 2012
election cycle to $1.06 billion in the 2016 cycle, and the number of Super
PACs almost doubled in those years from 1265 to 2392. 59 In the 2016
election, liberal Super PACs spent $440 million, and conservative Super
PACs spent $648.2 million. 60 Sixty-eight percent of the $1.6 billion raised
by Super PACs in the 2016 federal election cycle came from 100 individuals
and groups. 61 Super PAC spending in the 2016 election cycle constituted
sixty-three percent of all reported spending on federal campaigns. 62
The defenders generally saw the rise of Super PACs as a momentous
and highly problematic development. One said that “[t]he Super PAC . . . has
really transformed the political landscape . . . . You just have massive
infusions of money from sources that are able to give in the hundreds of
thousands and millions of dollars, concentrated in entities that then expend
it in unlimited amounts.” 63 Another asserted that Super PACs have facilitated
“the vast increase in the amount of money from the one-tenth of the one
percent.” 64 The defenders acknowledged that most of the money contributed
thus far to Super PACs has come not from commercial corporations but from
wealthy individuals, who have long been legally permitted to make unlimited
independent expenditures in connection with elections under the Buckley
framework. 65 One stressed that “that’s the thing people don’t understand,
that the money coming from individuals, the big wealthy donors, could come
before Citizens United and can come now.” 66 Another lawyer observed that
“[w]hat you are seeing is a lot of money that’s attributed to Citizens United
58. 599 F.3d at 694.
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS,
59. Outside
Spending,
CTR.
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2016
[https://perma.cc/WN24392Z].
60. Emily Dalgo & Ashley Balcerzak, Seven Years Later: Blurred Boundaries, More Money, CTR.
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS:
OPENSECRETS
BLOG
(Jan.
19,
2017),
FOR
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/01/citizens-united-7-years-later/
[https://perma.cc/7KHZT935].
61. See 2016 Super PACs: How Many Donors Give?, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=B
[https://perma.cc/A7RR-QDKW].
62. Outside Spending, supra note 59.
63. Confidential Interview 34.
64. Confidential Interview 28.
65. The amounts involved are large: in the 2016 election cycle, 135 donors gave more than $1
million to outside groups, including Super PACs, “dark money” groups, and other types of outside groups.
Dalgo & Balcerzak, supra note 60.
66. Confidential Interview 11.
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but it’s being spent by very wealthy people, typically individuals—
individuals who before this case could have gone ahead and spent that money
directly anyway.” 67 But prior to SpeechNow, wealthy individuals who
wanted to spend huge sums to influence elections would have been required
to take personal responsibility for the advertisements that the individuals
placed (“I am Bob Billionaire, and I approve the message.”) 68
Some defenders noted that the consequences of Citizens United as to
both corporations and wealthy individuals have been more “psychological”
than legal. One explained that “[t]he game that you played” before Citizens
United “was that companies stayed away from express advocacy” or “they
would fund organizations and you would get these . . . letters of assurance
that the organization would not do anything that would require them to
disclose the donors. . . . It’s a concern to this day.” He added, “but I’ve
noticed a psychological difference, which is prior to Citizens United, had
they ended up funding express advocacy, they were doing something illegal.
After Citizens United it was no longer illegal; they’d just be embarrassed.” 69
Another defender described a similar psychological phenomenon with
respect to wealthy individuals:
I think the Citizens United opinion unlocked any inhibitions that very
wealthy people had to work out mechanisms to pour money into the
campaign. The Super PACs and the vast increase in the amount of money
from the one-tenth of the one percent, in part, I think, is attributable to the
Supreme Court—the powerful rhetoric in the Supreme Court. 70

Defenders scorned several factual premises of the majority opinion. In
particular, they found highly implausible its assumption that, because
expenditures are legally required to be independent of campaigns, they
actually are independent. One said that the Court seemed to “have no idea
that the FEC has gutted all the coordination rules . . . plus the fact the FEC
doesn’t enforce the laws anyway.” 71 Some also criticized Justice Kennedy’s
assertion that expenditures would be transparent because they would be
disclosed. 72 One lawyer rejected both of those assumptions:

67. Confidential Interview 12.
68. See Alschuler et al., supra note 3, at 27–28.
69. Confidential Interview 11.
70. Confidential Interview 28.
71. Confidential Interview 18.
72. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370–71 (2010) (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. . . . This transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages”).
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The Kennedy opinion basically operates as follows. The First Amendment
protects spending by corporations and that does not pose any threat of
corruption or the appearance of corruption because of two salient facts.
One, that by definition the spending is totally independent of a campaign
so there is no opportunity for corruption, and two, because the spending
will be entirely transparent and subject to complete disclosure . . . . His
whole worldview is premised on these twin assumptions about the
spending not being coordinated and the spending being subject to
disclosure. Neither of those premises are correct in the real
world. . . . Citizens United leeched pretty quickly from just being a case
about corporate spending to also kind of a change in the law relating to
contributions to political committees that engage only in independent
spending—Super PACs . . . Super PACs . . . quickly mutated into this
kind of sub-species of individual candidate Super PACs which are as a
practical matter functioning basically just as a soft money arm of the
campaign. So, if you look at the relationship between a candidate . . . and
that candidate’s individual candidate Super PAC, nobody in their right
mind would describe that as an independent operation that poses no threat
of corruption when a donor gives a $10 million contribution to the Super
PAC and essentially there’s no wall between the donor, the Super PAC,
and the candidate. It’s all one integrated operation. So that premise of the
Kennedy opinion as it has been implemented through the growth of
individual candidate Super PACs . . . is just ludicrous. 73

Another lawyer made a similar argument about what the lawyer viewed as
the majority’s failure to anticipate the likely ramifications:
The Court didn’t know what the hell they were doing. . . . Now they knew
what they were doing in saying “[w]e don’t like restrictions, period.” But
they didn’t know what the implications were. They didn’t know they were
going to wind up with Super PACs and unlimited contributions flooding
the system and nonprofit groups spending hundreds of millions of dollars
in secret contributions. 74

A third defender stated that “the Roberts Court is very unrealistic about
politics, intentionally unrealistic. I don’t think they’re naïve; I think they’re
just ignoring what’s going on.” 75
Many of the defenders asserted that the combination of the narrowed
definition of corruption adopted in Citizens United, the Court’s general
skepticism about campaign finance regulation, and the FEC’s lack of
enforcement of existing regulations, has resulted in an almost complete
breakdown of campaign finance regulation. These responses were typical:
[T]he experiment we’re running today, which is largely result of Citizens
United and the kind of implementation of the vision of the five
73.
74.
75.

Confidential Interview 6.
Confidential Interview 18.
Confidential Interview 11.
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conservative justices, is an experiment in basically a completely
deregulated campaign finance system. There are still rules on the books.
There are still contribution limits on the books. There are still disclosure
rules on the books, which the Roberts Court purports to uphold and
support. . . . But, as a practical matter in the real world, if you look at the
2016 campaign, what you see is a world in which there are no contribution
limits. And as a practical matter, it’s so easy for individuals and candidates
to get around disclosure rules that anybody who’s interested in avoiding
the disclosure rules can do so. So as a practical matter, we’re living in a
world without contribution limits and disclosure rules. 76
[Citizens United] has led all these other things to start to tumble
down. . . . [I]t was kind of a signal to the world and to the lower courts to
not take these laws very seriously and to start thinking about ways to get
rid of them. A lot of what you’ve seen is people just ignoring them, in
terms of setting up these Super PACs and using them basically as
campaign arms. . . . Because nobody thinks any of these laws are
constitutional anymore and so they don’t pay [attention to them] . . . . And
the FEC has gotten itself into a position where it doesn’t enforce anything
because the Republicans have gotten into the position of absolutism on
these laws, all of it encouraged indirectly by Citizens United. So they don’t
think any of these laws should be enforced and then they won’t let any of
these laws be enforced, and so the whole thing has kind of unraveled. And
it’s going to continue to unravel, I think. 77

Another lawyer said that Citizens United “open[ed] the door for the
destruction of the campaign finance regime that the Court had upheld for
decades.” 78
The larger consequences of the deregulation of campaign finance,
defenders say, is increased inequality in the political process and a grave
threat to the future of American democracy. Their comments on the
consequences of Citizens United are filled with references to the need to
protect the integrity of elections and political equality against the outsized
influence of wealthy individuals and commercial corporations. Their words
evoke images of physical power, intimidation, coercion, and control by those
who would harm vulnerable democratic processes:
I think this is a world that’s largely dominated by the smallest segment of
the richest people in the country who have the ability to stand up a
presidential candidate or congressional candidate, and just on the power
of money take that candidate very, very far down the road, and certainly
bend candidates to their will in terms of policy positions and positions on
issues. You look at the spectacle of candidates. . . the Republican
76.
77.
78.

Confidential Interview 6.
Confidential Interview 21.
Confidential Interview 18.
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candidates, traipsing to Las Vegas and kind of bending the knee to
Sheldon Adelson, and you have to ask questions about whether this is
really the way our government should work, or politics should work, or
democracy should work. And whether the kinds of extreme, increasingly
extreme forms of inequality that characterize society generally, and
characterize sort of the economic sphere, should leech over to such an
extreme extent into the political sphere. 79
It’s hard to doubt all the ways in which Citizens United has kind of
undermined our democracy by allowing corporations and the wealthy to
spend huge amounts of money to help elect candidates to do their
bidding. 80
The ramifications of [Citizens United] are huge. . . You have millionaires
and billionaires playing a dominant role . . . with unlimited contributions
to so-called individual candidate Super PACs that are . . . not independent;
they’re arms of the campaigns. We’ve had hundreds of millions of dollars
of secret money coming into the campaigns. We have corporate money,
mostly in the form of money spent by incorporated nonprofits, but that
was prohibited prior to this decision. . . . [Citizens United] basically says
that democracy has no capacity to protect itself from corruption when
you’re dealing with the right of people to spend money. 81
In McConnell, the Court upheld a system that, while not perfect, went a
long way towards limiting the ability of wealthy individuals and
corporations to essentially control the process. And in Citizens
United, . . . the Court completely undermined that whole system of
regulating money in politics. 82
The Roberts Court [is] giving us the Anatole France First Amendment,
which means that the First Amendment in its majestic impartiality allows
gigantic corporations and ordinary citizens alike to spend as much as they
want electing their preferred candidates to office. And that’s the vision of
equality and of the First Amendment that we’re left with. It is a completely
sterile and formalistic view of rights and how they play out in our
democracy, and it leaves people who don’t have money, don’t have
immense aggregations of wealth that they can spend on politics . . . with
less of a voice, and it leaves us with a system where . . . the strength of
your voice depends on the size of your wallet. That’s not what democracy
is supposed to look like. 83
Pick up any newspaper on any day this year. . . . And you’ll see an article
about the problems that Citizens United has [along with other campaign

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Confidential Interview 6.
Confidential Interview 7.
Confidential Interview 18.
Confidential Interview 22.
Confidential Interview 23.
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finance decisions by the Roberts Court] caused. My own view is that
money in politics, big money in big politics, creates an inherent,
inescapable risk of corruption, properly defined as including influence and
access, a definition the Court rejected or abandoned. And I think it’s
important because I think the net result nationally is that there’s less
speech going on in the country as voters get turned off, and potential voters
get turned off and saddened and disgusted by the apparent fact that the
candidates, virtually all of them, are dependent on a small handful of very
wealthy people to fund their campaign and to help them develop, or push
them into the positions they take. I think that has potentially dire
consequences for participatory democracy. 84

The defenders generally agreed that Citizens United has been highly
consequential in terms of the public’s reaction. One called it “an interesting
case because of the resonance in popular culture of the decision.”85 Another
called the political effect of the decision “enormous” because “it’s become a
talking point in an age of inequality”:
It is a rallying cry. So to the extent that people have criticisms of the
Roberts [C]ourt or to the bias of our governing institutions at a time where
you have this massive disparity in wealth and growing disparity and
diminishing middle class, both purchasing power and prospects, you have
Citizens United as an example of a country that has built-in protections for
privilege. And this is the Supreme Court’s contribution. Congress makes
its own contribution, right? Wall Street makes its contribution. But this is
the Supreme Court’s contribution to advancing the political position of the
well-to-do at a time when the relative position of the well-to-do to the rest
of the country and the tilt of public policy toward the well-to-do is such a
central topic in our political debate. 86

Another asserted that Citizens United has led people of diverse political
perspectives to take notice of an issue they had not previously considered:
People have heard of Citizens United and they do not like it. I think that
there are large numbers of people from across the political spectrum who
are becoming aware that we have a political system that is not functioning
effectively. And they may have different views about what it would mean
for it to function effectively and different views about things like guns and
abortion. But I don’t think that very many members of the public think
that what the system really needs is larger infusions of corporate cash. 87

Some defenders also worried about the pervasive public cynicism they
believed had resulted from campaign finance deregulation. One lawyer, for
example, observed that campaign finance abuses revealed during Watergate

84.
85.
86.
87.

Confidential Interview 26.
Confidential Interview 10.
Confidential Interview 12.
Confidential Interview 34.
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“had the country set its hair on fire in the early ‘70s” but “are just
commonplace now” and that the country had become “inured” to such
abuses:
On the one hand, I think people are still very, very upset about it, but
there's a kind of sense of hopelessness about being able to do
anything . . . . We’re at this moment where things that just outraged the
public following Watergate now are just being met with a sense of futility
and, I think, somewhat with a sense of despair. 88

IV. THE CHALLENGERS’ VIEWS
Like the defenders, the sixteen challengers worked in a variety of
practice settings. But they were more diverse than the defenders in terms of
the constituencies they claimed to represent, the law schools they attended,
and the location of their offices. In these respects, these lawyers’
characteristics mirrored those of the larger pool of lawyers who represented
parties and amici on the side of Citizens United. 89 Some were libertarians,
some Republican establishment figures, and others business advocates, Tea
Partiers, and civil libertarians. Most of the challengers described themselves
as Republicans or Independents, although two were Democrats. The
lawyers’ particular positions in Citizens United varied with the interests and
commitments of their clients, but all of them indicated that they believed that
most campaign finance regulation is unconstitutional.
When asked about what was at stake in Citizens United, the challengers
endorsed the Court’s assertion that it was necessary to strike down these
limitations and precedents to vindicate the First Amendment. Their
responses included frequent references to the “marketplace of ideas” and
“free speech”, and they often characterized campaign finance regulations as
censorship. These comments about the stakes in Citizens United were
typical:
[It was] whether the government gets to determine who speaks, how much,
on what, for how long, very foundational things to the way that our
government works. [The decision] reaffirmed the importance of free
speech. You’re going to have more groups that will not be hesitant about
expressing their views collectively in the public realm. 90

88. Confidential Interview 6.
89. See Southworth, supra note 36 (finding that lawyers filing briefs on Citizens United’s side were
more likely than lawyers on the FEC’s side to work in the South or Midwest, and that they were less
likely than lawyers on the reform side to have attended law schools ranked in the top twenty by U.S. News
and World Report).
90. Confidential Interview 8.
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Rather than limiting speech, we should let more speech enter the
marketplace of ideas. 91
This is an issue of free speech versus government control and ultimately
censorship. 92
I think it just promotes the freedom of speech. That’s what I think the main
implications of it are. 93
I don’t think the government has any business telling people what they can
say, when they can say it, how they can say it, at what times, and in what
volumes, wearing what color hat, and hopping on which leg . . . . How
about we just go with free speech? 94
You can’t have free speech and exclude millions of organizations, like the
ACLU, like the Chamber of Commerce, like the AFL-CIO, like the
corporations, from the marketplace. . . Citizens United I just think is one
of the best First Amendment decisions ever written. . . . The First
Amendment says, almost without exception, what we say is our choice
and not the government’s choice. And how loud we say it, or how much
we say it is our choice and not the government’s choice. So I think it’s a
great decision. 95
I think that it has freed people to be able to . . . organizations like the NRA,
or other issue organizations, to be able to speak on behalf of their members
at election time without fear of being sanctioned or fined. 96
[H]aving corporate speech and commercial speech added to the
marketplace of ideas benefits democracy as a whole. 97
[G]overnment cannot screw with the marketplace of ideas. 98
[The statutory provision invalidated in Citizens United] violates the
corporations’ First Amendment rights not to be silenced. 99
[I]t simply cannot be forgotten that the government’s position in Citizens
United was that it could ban a documentary movie about a political
candidate during an election year. 100
We’ve helped ideas get into the marketplace . . . . That’s a good outcome.
I don’t care where that money comes from. 101
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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[T]o limit money in politics is to simply limit communication or limit
speech. It’s very simple and very straightforward and very true. And
there’s simply no refutation of that, that is possible. So, if you’re limiting
money, you’re limiting speech. 102

Some challengers emphasized, as the defenders generally conceded,
that the decision has not resulted in massive corporate spending on elections.
One lawyer stressed that “there’s not been much corporate money, despite
all the predictions of cataclysm,” 103 and another noted that predictions that
Citizens United would lead to a flood of corporate spending on the 2016
presidential race were “totally wrong.” 104 Like the defenders, many of the
challengers emphasized that most of the increased spending attributable to
Citizens United and SpeechNow.org has come from wealthy individuals and
not from public for-profit corporations:
The major effect wasn’t felt by . . . Fortune 500 corporations. . . . The
sorts of entities that people think about when they talk about, “Oh, there’s
too much corporate money[.]” Because that money hasn’t really increased.
It’s Super PACs or advocacy groups of the kind like the National
Federation of Independent Business, or Planned Parenthood, or the
NRA . . . . Most of the increased spending . . . has been in independent
advocacy groups and individuals—whether that’s Tom Steyer or Sheldon
Adelson, or the Koch brothers . . . . There is more independent spending
now, but it’s not your Microsofts and your Googles and your Exxons and
the traditional big corporations. 105

Another lawyer observed that despite all the editorials “talking about how
big corporations were going to rule America,” that has not happened. Rather,
he said, “[i]t’s the Adelsons” and other very wealthy individuals who “[a]fter
Citizens United . . . started to spend the money that Buckley v. Valeo
would’ve allowed them to spend, and which was sometimes spent, but not at
all as much as is now becoming the norm in American politics.” 106
Several of the challengers decried the increased role of Super PACs and
other vehicles for independent spending and their tendency to expand the
influence of extreme and unaccountable elements at the expense of the major
political parties. But some challengers offered a more positive account of the
infusion of money into politics since Citizens United and SpeechNow.org,
calling it evidence of healthy political engagement. One said that it “shows,
sort of bottled up demand for participation in elections, which has been
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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unleashed,” 107 and another claimed that the decisions have “led to increased
participation.” 108 One lawyer approved of how Super PACs enabled fifteen
Republican candidates to compete for the 2016 Republican presidential
nomination, “kind of buoying them along independently. . . keeping them
going with their messages.” 109 Another lawyer cited several instances in
which an injection of Super PAC funding has fueled competition between
candidates in races that would otherwise have been a lock: “It’s been good
for competition. It gets new ideas out, which [is] good.” 110
Like some defenders, who argued that the consequences of Citizens
United have been more “psychological” than legal, some challengers said
that the primary result of Citizens United has been that it clarified where the
lines were and emboldened people and organizations to spend money in
elections:
As a legal matter, all the ruling did was erase the express advocacy line
that unions and corporations, both business and non-profit, could not cross
in their public communications, which was really not, to me, a practically
meaningful line anyway. One could message effectively towards whatever
electoral result one wanted without having to explicitly say, “vote for” or
“vote against.” I actually thought it was an unconstitutional restriction. I
believe the decision was fundamentally correct. But I think the
consequence has been more cultural than legal, in that it has relaxed, to
some degree, strictures that organizations and perhaps individuals put on
themselves in part because they were afraid there were lines out there. 111

Another lawyer explained that, for decades prior to Citizens United, the FEC
“was quite experimental in devising legal standards which they would do
primarily through selective enforcement” and that people and organizations
subject to these standards tended to settle rather than fight. 112 He maintained
that Citizens United clarified the law and “basically established rules that
people could follow” and “eliminated a great deal of uncertainty as to what
the rules were.” 113
As for critics’ complaints about the definition of corruption used in
Citizens United, challengers defended the Supreme Court’s approach. One
complained that “the bounds of the term ‘corruption’” prior to Citizens
United “had gotten scarily out of control—that corruption. . . . Well, it could

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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mean almost anything associated with money in politics.” 114 Other
challengers suggested that any definition that goes beyond quid pro quo
corruption is inconsistent with representative democracy. 115 Several lawyers
asserted that there is no principled distinction between influence based on
financial power and influence based on the techniques used by community
organizers to get out the vote, or the influence wielded by celebrities and the
mainstream media. 116
Several challengers acknowledged that Citizens United is unpopular but
chalked that up to the public’s misunderstanding. One insisted that the

114. Confidential Interview 20.
115. See, e.g., Confidential Interview 25 (“If you have a government whose main check is the will
of the people, so to speak, then people are going clamor to influence politics and get government to do
what they want it to. That’s not a good thing, but in a free society with a representative form of
government if you call that corruption then you’re saying that the government itself is corrupt in some
sense, which I actually think is true.”).
The view that politicians’ responsiveness to donors is a necessary feature of democracy is
suggested by the Supreme Court in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and again in McCutcheon v.
FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), which invalidated overall limits on the total contributions an individual can
give in an election cycle. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of
an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the
voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one
candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes
the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness.
558 U.S. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310). In his majority
opinion for the Court in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to preserve
authority for the Government to combat corruption, without at the same time compromising the
political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the Government to
favor some participants in that process over others. As Edmund Burke explained in his famous
speech to the electors of Bristol, a representative owes constituents the exercise of his “mature
judgment,” but judgment informed by “the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the
most unreserved communication with his constituents.” Constituents have the right to support
candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent
orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such
responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.
134 S. Ct. at 1461–62 (citation omitted).
Several of the defenders strongly disagreed with this understanding of representative
government and the meaning of Burke’s speech. One observed:
It was actually interesting that what they quoted was from Burke about how representatives . . .
should feel beholden to their supporters. Well, he was talking about voters and constituents. He
wasn’t talking about donors! But the court conflated all of that and said basically that there’s
nothing wrong with an office holder feeling beholden to large donors. That’s politics. Well, I
think that was really dangerous, and that was really significant.
Confidential Interview 11.
116. Confidential Interviews 37, 43, 44.
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decision’s consequences have been “overstated,” 117 and another said that
they have been “very different than what the Left would have you
believe.” 118 Another claimed that the decision has “served to sharpen debate
about campaign finance laws” but “generally at a very simplistic and almost
cartoonish level. . . . People use [Citizens United] as a shorthand, and they
don’t even know what they’re using it as a shorthand for. 119 Another
challenger remarked that “most of the on-the-ground criticism . . . on what’s
happened as a result [of Citizens United] is inaccurate to the point of
distortion.” 120
V. DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE LESSONS OF CITIZENS UNITED
The lawyers on the two sides do not disagree fundamentally about how
Citizens United has affected the political process in the short-term. They
agree that it has not (yet) unleased a huge wave of direct corporate spending
in elections but that it has channeled more corporate money into nonprofit
groups, some of which do not disclose their sources. They agree that Citizens
United led directly to the D.C. Circuit’s momentous ruling in
SpeechNow.org. They agree that Super PACs have since multiplied and
grown and that most of the money contributed to Super PACs and other types
of outside groups has come from wealthy individuals. They also agree that
the primary short-term consequences of Citizens United have been more
psychological than legal, in that they have clarified the lines and emboldened
those who wish to put money in politics to do so without fear of sanction.
But the lawyers offered very different perspectives on whether Citizens
United has been good or bad for the political process and what lessons the
public should learn. The defenders generally said that the Court’s holding
that commercial corporations possess the same First Amendment rights as
natural persons to spend money on elections is a dangerous turn and that the
Court’s narrowing of the corruption rationale had contributed to
disproportionate political influence by economically powerful institutions
and individuals. The challengers applauded the decision as a victory for free
speech and insisted that any adverse fallout from Citizens United was a price
worth paying to protect the free flow of ideas.
Disagreement between the defenders and challengers on the larger
lessons of Citizens United appear to reflect very different attitudes about

117.
118.
119.
120.

Confidential Interview 19.
Confidential Interview 36.
Confidential Interview 19.
Confidential Interview 31.
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government and the possibility of fairly regulating money in politics without
stifling political association and dissent. The defenders envisioned an
essential and positive role for government in ensuring fair elections and
political equality. The challengers, on the other hand, were skeptical about
government in general and especially about whether government can be
trusted to regulate money in politics. They viewed the regulation of political
spending as an intrusion on individual liberty.
Many of the defenders asserted that government has a responsibility to
ensure that inequalities in the economic sphere do not subvert democratic
processes. One argued that “it’s the government’s duty to intervene, to try to
retain some rough sense of political equality in the country. And to the extent
that money becomes a mechanism by which one person can exercise outsized
political power, then I think it is appropriate for the government to step
in.” 121 Another said that government “has a role to ensure that our rights as
Americans are protected in the political process,” so that “when it comes to
money in politics, that means ensuring that our voices are not drowned out
by big money interests, that we have a right to equal participation in the
process, and that we’re not locked out of an exclusionary process that
determines who shall govern in America.” 122 The same lawyer asserted that
what has happened with the campaign finance system is we have allowed
those economic inequalities to spill over and dominate our political
process, so much so that the vast majority of the public believes that our
system is rigged. . . . And that undermines the faith in our elections but
also in our government. 123

Many of the challengers suggested that the concern about money in
politics would disappear if conservatives succeeded in rolling back
government. One libertarian stressed that “[t]he problem isn’t money in
politics; the problem is the government has accumulated too much power
that it doesn’t rightly possess, particularly at the federal level. . . . [If the
government were much more limited] we wouldn’t have [the] massive
concern that we have about money in politics.” 124 Another acknowledged
“discomfort” with the amount of money in politics, but pointed out that “the
conservative response is, ‘[l]ook, if you want money out of politics, get
government out of our lives. And then, there’s no real impetus for the money
to be there in the first place.’” 125 Another explained that
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Confidential Interview 28.
Confidential Interview 49.
Id.
Confidential Interview 3.
Confidential Interview 14.
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if access and influence are a problem, they are a problem because of the
size and scope of government. What we’re concerned about is the
government is going to hand out favors that it shouldn’t be handing out or
it’s going to be doling out punishment to people who should not be
punished. 126

Some challengers were skeptical about whether it’s even possible to
regulate campaign finance. One said, “[y]ou’re never going to get money out
of politics.” 127 A lawyer who said that he shared some of defenders’ concerns
about money in politics nevertheless believed that “in the end . . . efforts to
regulate them do not work.” 128 Another challenger claimed that “realistically
I think that money finds a way whatever the rules are,” 129 while another
referred to this as the “hydraulic” theory of campaign finance 130—that “when
you clamp down on money[ ] in one place, it tends to pop up someplace
else.” 131 A libertarian stated,
I think we have more political speech now than we ever did, and if the
billionaires have more to say, what else is new? And if you limit them,
they’re going to go buy a newspaper, and if you limit that, they’re going
to fund a cause organization. You know, you can’t stop it without having
the kind of total control that we usually associate with North Korea or
places like that. 132

Many challengers claimed that campaign finance regulations invariably
advantage those writing the rules, typically incumbents, and tend to be used
cynically for strategic political advantage. One said that
when you watch what happens at the FEC, you can’t help but recognize
that the vast majority of complaints have nothing to do with corruption or
access or anything else. They have to do with “[t]his will hinder my
opponent in this race.” That’s what these things are primarily used for. 133

Another lawyer noted that the “accommodations and compromises” made as
part of the process to achieve campaign finance regulation always “jigger[]

126. Confidential Interview 37.
127. Confidential Interview 42.
128. Confidential Interview 44.
129. Confidential Interview 35.
130. For the origins of this term, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708, 1718 (1999) (arguing that “political money, like
water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air” and calling this the “hydraulic
principle”); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“Money, like water, will always find
an outlet.”).
131. Confidential Interview 37.
132. Confidential Interview 32.
133. Confidential Interview 44.
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the system . . . to the perceived benefit or detriment of certain
participants.” 134
Most of the challengers supported only minimal campaign finance
regulations, and some favored no regulation at all. One advocate said that he
supported the goals articulated by defenders, including “fairness, . . . some
measure of transparency, and . . . integrity,” but that “reform proposals go
way beyond that.” 135 Several challengers asserted that disclosure is all that
is required to ensure the integrity of the process. 136 Even as to disclosure,
some of the challengers expressed skepticism, because they thought that that
those drafting and enforcing disclosure rules would use them to punish
political enemies. One lawyer suggested that some conservatives who had
previously supported disclosure “now see how it’s being abused and
potentially abused, in that it’s being used a weapon.” 137 Several challengers
mentioned the Internal Revenue Service scandal involving increased
scrutiny of tax-exempt status applications from groups with “Tea Party” or
“Patriot” in their names as evidence that government could not be trusted to
wield power responsibly. 138
Several of the libertarians and lawyers associated with Tea Party groups
maintained that government should play no role whatsoever with respect to
campaign finance. One said that the proper role of government with respect
to money in politics is “essentially none.” 139 Another advocated giving
134. Confidential Interview 16.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Confidential Interview 2 (“Ultimately the voters decide who will be running the
government, and if they want a government that is corrupt then they’ll vote for that and if they want a
government that is not corrupt then they’ll vote for that.”); Confidential Interview 39 (“The view I take
is all the regulations should be removed and all that should be required is public reporting. As long as
there’s public reporting that’s required then it’s up to the voters to decide. Okay, so you have a candidate
and he takes money from the tobacco industry or he takes money from the oil industry or he takes money
from the crypto-Marxist groups or he takes money from foreign countries, alright, so you just report
it. . . . So, now, it’s up to you. You’re the voter, you decide. This guy is taking money from whoever it is,
billionaires, industry, labor unions, Marxist groups, so whichever it is. You know where he gets his
money, it’s up to you to decide. It’s not up to the government to say, ‘[y]ou can’t take money to present
your views to the public.’”).
137. Confidential Interview 16.
138. See Emily Cochrane, Justice Department Settles with Tea Party Groups After I.R.S. Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/irs-tea-party-lawsuitsettlement.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4ANG-DJLV]. The Inspector General’s report of cases between
2004 and 2013 found that the IRS had targeted not only conservative groups but also liberal organizations
whose names included terms such as “Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN),” “Progressive,” “Green Energy,” “Medical Marijuana,” and “Occupy.” TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REF. NO. 2017-10-054, REVIEW OF
SELECTED CRITERIA USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/201710054fr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MUNJLRC].
139. Confidential Interview 3.
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campaign contributions the same constitutional protection as expenditures
and lifting all other campaign finance restrictions: we “should criminalize
bribery, purchasing of favors, that sort of thing, and that’s it. I don’t think
political speech should be regulated.” 140 One lawyer proudly noted that he is
so committed to deregulating campaign finance that he filed an amicus brief
in Bluman v. Federal Election Commission 141 to argue that non-citizens who
are lawfully within the United States should be allowed to spend money or
make contributions in U.S. elections.
The language used by the defenders and challengers in interviews
differed in some easily quantifiable ways. Defenders used “equal” and
“equality” almost four times as often as challengers and “democracy” six
times as often. Challengers used variations on “speech” and “speaker” twice
as often as defenders and “freedom” and “liberty” three times as frequently.
Differences in the commentary of the defenders and challengers appear
to reflect not just contrasting policy positions and the conscious
manipulation of language and precedent, but also variation in underlying
conceptual metaphors. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have shown,
metaphor is pervasive in everyday language and thought and in the way we
view and experience the world, although its influence is often invisible to
us. 142 Lakoff has also argued that conservatives and progressives hold
conflicting and typically unconscious worldviews structured through
metaphor. 143 Conceptual metaphor also pervades legal thought and
reasoning, 144 and it plays an important role in campaign finance
jurisprudence. The “marketplace of ideas” concept elaborated by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Abrams v. United States 145 imagines ideas as
140. Confidential Interview 13.
141. 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (mem.).
142. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
143. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
THINK (3d ed. 2016).
144. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW LIFE, AND MIND, at xiii (2001)
(explaining that the book’s purpose is to explore the social constructs that “animate thinking and
decisionmaking among lawyers, judges, and laypersons alike”); MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 68 (1992)
(asserting that legal metaphors are the products of “history and usage,” which shape their “deepest
meanings and applications,” and arguing that “the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a
major factor in legitimating big business” ); GORDON, supra note 11, at 128 (noting that judicial reasoning
is “primarily doctrinal, categorical, and analogical”); id. at 261 (observing that “our views [of the past’s
relationship to the present] are mediated by familiar narrative story-lines that are so deeply entrenched in
our consciousness that we are often unaware of their rule over our conception of reality. These storylines, like other mentalities, have a history filled with ideological purposes, and there always exist—and
so we always may draw upon—competing stories that impress the same historical experience with
radically divergent meanings”).
145. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
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commodities that are bought, sold and traded in a competitive market. 146
That frame looms large in the Supreme Court Justices’ disagreements about
the boundaries of permissible campaign finance regulation.147 Metaphorical
thinking also underlies Buckley’s holding that spending money to sway an
election is speech, 148 as well as Citizens United’s ruling that corporations
enjoy the same First Amendment protections as natural persons with respect
to campaign spending and that singling out corporations for special treatment
constitutes a type of impermissible discrimination. 149
Commentary by the interviewed lawyers shows both sides using the
same metaphors. But, while many of the challengers found these metaphors
dispositive, defenders emphasized their limitations and argued that, even if
useful, they must be tweaked to make sense of the First Amendment’s
broader purposes.
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
146. See WINTER, supra note 144, at 18–19, 20, 271–73.
147. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (“Austin interferes with the ‘open
marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment”) (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 279–80 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] legislative judgment that ‘enough is enough’ should command the greatest possible
deference from judges interpreting a constitutional provision that, at best, has an indirect relationship to
activity that affects the quantity—rather than the quality or the content—of repetitive speech in the
marketplace of ideas.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809–10 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“Massachusetts could permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon the political
activities of corporations would have placed it in a position of departing from neutrality and indirectly
assisting the propagation of corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate
acquisition of funds to finance such activities. Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening
the role of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.”); McCutcheon v. FEC,
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Speech does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, political
communication seeks to secure government action. A politically oriented ‘marketplace of ideas’ seeks to
form a public opinion that can and will influence elected representatives.”).
148. For key language in Buckley suggesting that spending money on elections is protected speech,
see supra note 25 and accompanying text. The Buckley Court also analogized a political campaign to an
automobile and election spending to gas in the tank. 424 U.S. 1, 19 n.18 (1976) (“Being free to engage in
unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile
as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”).
The argument that election spending is speech gained currency when Justice Potter Stewart
articulated the now widely used shorthand for the challengers’ position—money is speech—in oral
argument: “We are talking about speech, money is speech and speech is money, whether it is buying
television or radio time or newspaper advertising, or even buying pencils and paper and microphones.”
ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW 55 (1988).
149. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343 (stating that corporations should not “be treated differently
under the First Amendment simply because [they] are not ‘natural persons’” (quoting Belotti, 435 U.S. at
776)); id. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on the
speaker’s corporate identity.”).
For examples of scholarship discussing of the significance (or insignificance) of the Court’s use
of the corporate personhood metaphor in Citizens United, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional
Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014), and Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2015).
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Defenders focused on the need to regulate markets to ensure their
integrity and correct for market failure. One observed that the marketplace
of ideas metaphor as it applies to money in elections is “powerful” but that
“the question is, like any marketplace, is there no role for regulation within
that marketplace?” 150 Another mused that “[t]here is no real, unregulated
marketplace of free ideas, right? . . . You’re not gonna compete with folks
with millions of dollars who buy the instrumentalities to get their opinions
across if you’re a guy standing on the street corner.” 151 Another contended
that “[l]ike in capitalism, you can’t leave it—the use of money in politics—
unfettered because I think it just leads to real abuses.” 152
The defenders also argued that the First Amendment is about more than
free speech—that it also protects the conditions necessary for citizens to
govern themselves in a representative democracy. These comments were
typical:
I’ve always thought that the First Amendment serves a larger purpose in
preserving our democracy than simply guaranteeing free speech for
everybody. . . I think it also serves, was intended to serve, as a sort of
fundamental building block of the democratic process. And so I’m not a
First Amendment absolutist who believes that any government regulation
of speech even through the proxy of money is necessarily inconsistent
with the First Amendment values. If, in fact, there’s enough of a
demonstration that government regulation is needed in order to maintain
a democratic structure, that certain voices don’t overwhelm other voices
and don’t discourage participation . . . I think that that can constitute a
compelling interest to allow the government to regulate . . . in a modest
way and limited fashion . . . And in particular, I think government can take
affirmative actions, as long as they’re done on a non-discriminatory basis,
and without impinging on other people’s freedoms, to encourage people
to participate in the process, and to level the playing field in a way that
wouldn’t otherwise exist if we just relied upon pure money as the end-allbe-all of who could speak and how much. 153
There’s a tendency to apply the First Amendment as a literal statement
that you take out of context and you give an open-ended pass to anybody
who’s purportedly speaking. And that’s not necessarily the way that the
Constitution was designed to work. It was a total document and that
document is supposed to preserve integrity. And if the speech is out of
control, and of course calling money speech is a huge step, but if it’s out
of control, then that’s not consistent with the Constitution taken as a
whole. 154

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Confidential Interview 28.
Confidential Interview 48.
Confidential Interview 11.
Confidential Interview 27.
Confidential Interview 33.
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The Court is just turning the Constitution on its head when it’s saying,
“[w]ell, it’s only that individual corruption you can get at but a more
systemic corruption that threatens the system’s dependence on the people
is beyond review. . . . History shows the majority’s reinterpreting the First
Amendment and ignoring the really important powers that Congress and
state legislatures have to root out corruption to ensure electoral
integrity. 155

The challengers, on the other hand, generally endorsed the equation of
political spending and speech, and many of them characterized campaign
finance regulation as censorship. One, for example, warned about the
dangers of the reasoning that leads defenders to favor regulation:
Some of the campaign finance reform groups . . . [argue] that the First
Amendment imposes almost an obligation on the government to limit
speech so that the speech of the powerful does not drown out the speech
of the not powerful—in other words, leveling the playing field by lowering
the volume of debate . . . I find that a very troubling prospect. It’s
troubling not only because it does limit free and open debate, but it also
has to vest someone with the authority to determine what level of debate
we want and that someone who determines the level of debate we want is
also going to be in a position presumably to determine how much criticism
people can venture about where that volume has been set. 156

Another said of efforts to regulate access, influence and systemic corruption,
“[they] pose tremendous dangers . . . to open democratic debate, when
you’re giving government this power.” 157 Another challenger explained that
his organization’s position in Citizens United was simple: “Look, this is an
issue of free speech versus government control and ultimately
censorship.” 158
Several lawyers associated with conservative and libertarian
organizations claimed that campaign finance regulation reflected a desire by
liberals, the media, and even some in the Republican establishment, to stifle
dissent and keep elites in charge. One lawyer described the deregulation of
campaign finance as a “free market” solution to money in politics and
contrasted that approach with the “socialist solution,” which is that
“government must be in our lives and regulate every corner of it and . . .
prevent people from speaking out about the government and regulation in
our lives.” 159 He chalked up campaign finance restrictions to elites’ disdain
for conservatives:
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Confidential Interview 7.
Confidential Interview 20.
Confidential Interview 44.
Confidential Interview 25.
Confidential Interview 14.
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The liberal thinks you’re stupid because you’re not voting the right way
because if you were, if you were smart, you’d vote for them. And because
you’re not voting for them, clearly, you’re stupid and you don’t know what
you’re doing, and we have to prevent you from voting just because you
saw a TV ad. Clearly, you’re dumb, you’re voting the way of the last TV
ad you saw. We have to stop this, we have to protect you from these bad
ideas, so that you vote the right way, which is our way, and so we’re going
to institute all these protections to make it really hard for you to get bad
ideas in your head that will keep you from voting with us, which is the
right way to vote. That’s the liberal model.

Another lawyer active with libertarian groups said:
I don’t really understand the arguments against [Citizens United]. I don’t
understand what they’re afraid of. They’re not getting shouted down . . .
They’re the ones that have the dominant social positions. And I do have a
big problem with the state of America’s media, which I don’t think is
performing their original function. It just tends to be completely party
controlled—controlled primarily by the Democrat party, in my opinion.
So for any of these people on the Left to say, “[o]h we’re getting shouted
down by the billionaires.” You’re not getting shouted down by the
billionaires; you’re shouting down everyone else! 160

A lawyer associated with Tea Party groups answered my question about the
government’s proper role with respect to money in politics with “What is
hard to understand about the first five words of the First Amendment:
‘Congress shall make no law’? I mean, I don’t think the government should
have a role. And I think what we’ve seen is an entire regulatory apparatus
that is bent upon silencing certain voices.” 161
Several defenders expressed frustration that the money-is-speech and
free market frames have worked so well in mobilizing opposition to
campaign finance regulation. One said that “framing has been hugely
important, hugely important.” He argued that “the McCarthy experience” has
“shaped this generation and the generations after” and has fueled “mistrust
over any government regulatory power at all, but certainly government
regulatory power over communication.” That, in turn, “led to a framing of
this as a white hat/black hat problem, where the speaker always wore the
white hat and the regulator always wore the black hat.” 162 Another lawyer
bemoaned the challengers’ success in arguing that what’s at stake campaign
finance regulation is “not just a question of money; it’s a question of our
ability to criticize, our ability to speak out.” 163 Another defender drew a
160.
161.
162.
163.

Confidential Interview 39.
Confidential Interview 36.
Confidential Interview 28.
Id.
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connection between the speech metaphor’s power and defenders’ inability to
persuade the Republican base that deregulating campaign finance was not in
their interests. He said that he wished that he could convince them that
“nobody’s trying to take away your right to stand on a street corner and
scream, and do all that!” but
all your screaming and yelling about an issue, or discussing, or debating,
or going to town hall meetings [will not matter]; the reason that you don’t
get a real debate is because, frankly, corporate lobbyists generally don’t
feel the need to go to those meetings because that’s not where the
decisions are being made. 164

Several defenders lamented the rise and prevalence of the view that
regulation is generally ineffective and fraught with unintended negative
consequences and that rent-seeking inevitably corrupts policymaking. 165
One argued that such profound mistrust of government explains how some
opponents could advocate the complete deregulation of campaign finance;
“if you allow any regulation of it, it’s going to be abused—it’s going be used
to suppress speech—and so, nope, you just can’t have any of it.” 166
Defenders acknowledged that they were at a disadvantage in mobilizing
a simple frame that can withstand constitutional challenge. The keywords
that arose most frequently in their responses to questions about the issues at
stake in campaign finance litigation—democracy, equality, voice, and
integrity—do not add up to a winning legal theory given the Court’s recent
precedents and current composition. One lawyer said, “[o]ne of the
fundamental problems that we are facing on the reform side is that, especially
under the Roberts Court, but also before that, starting with Buckley v. Valeo,
the Court has essentially ruled out some of the most compelling justifications
for regulating campaign finance.” 167 Another asserted that it is “not simply a
question of whether the money can corrupt an office holder, it’s a question
of whether it small c corrupts and undermines the integrity of the political
system, of the government, and of course it does.” 168 Another insisted that
“we need a new jurisprudence that allows us to voice the goals of political
164.
165.
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equality and equal voice beyond just the interest in deterring corruption.” 169
Arguing that more could be done within the speech metaphor underlying
forty years of campaign finance doctrine by emphasizing the importance of
“voice”, another lawyer said, “[a]nd so, to me, the frames are about voice
and power, not about clean governance, not about anti-corruption, and less
about integrity of our democracy.” 170 This approach “buys into the speech
frame a little bit,” but flips it to ask, “but what kind of voice do I have over
the decisions that affect my life, and should I be drowned out and should that
be equal?” 171 Another suggested that the challenge was even more
fundamental:
We really need to reexamine the whole idea that money is speech. People
like Larry Tribe . . . get[ ] really mad when you say that: “That’s an
oversimplification, that’s a bumper sticker, that’s not . . . .” But the truth
is that has been kind of the guiding star for the Supreme Court since
Buckley—is that money is speech and that that’s the end of the analysis.
And I think they’ve got to go back to looking at, “[y]es, money can
facilitate speech, just like loud speakers can facilitate speech or newspaper
delivery trucks facilitate speech,” but we don’t just say you can’t regulate
newspaper delivery trucks, because they are speech. That’s kind of what
we do with money. So I think that’s just totally wrongheaded. 172

Another defender asserted that “Citizens United is just not gonna stand” and
that when the Court eventually overturns the decision “it’s going to be with
a broader rationale than came out of the Buckley decision.” 173
Several lawyers observed that activists on opposing sides of this issue
see the world very differently and tend to talk past each other. One defender
said that conceptual frames affect not only how people convey ideas to others
but also “the way that people perceive things” and that “something that I may
perceive as being a reasonable effort to force somebody to come clean and
disclose, limit in some manner, the conservatives generally see as big bad
government coming in and stifling speech. And it’s like everything is really
viewed through that lens.” 174 A challenger explained that issues that “are
really complicated” “tend to be reduced to slogans and little snippets of
‘reform’ or ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty.’ All of those values are implicated here,
but how it’s all implemented and how it operates is complex.” 175 A lawyer
on the challengers’ side who described himself as a rare moderate
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Republican who believed that “Buckley largely got it right” asserted that
“[t]he national debate is insipid and stupid on both sides.” He spoke of the
difficulty of “policing the line between contributions and expenditures” and
ensuring that campaign finance regulations are “predictable and understood
and not subject to political gamesmanship” in a “political environment where
everyone’s just screaming at each other.” 176
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay shows that lawyers on opposing sides of Citizens United
bring very different views to questions about money in politics in general
and to the consequences of the ruling in particular. They largely agree about
the decision’s direct consequences, but they offer wildly divergent
conclusions about its lessons. Both sets of lawyers characterize the other
side’s position as a danger to the future of representative democracy, and
both sides use populist rhetoric to explain their positions. But they identify
different sets of conditions as essential for democracy to thrive, and they
identify different sets of elites as the primary threat. Defenders assert that
campaign finance regulation is necessary to ensure that citizens hold equal
political power corresponding with the one person one vote principle, and
they see those who oppose the restrictions at issue in Citizens United as too
willing to allow economic inequality to translate into political inequality.
The challengers characterize themselves as the guardians of liberty and the
First Amendment, and they regard defenders as apologists for incumbents,
the liberal media, censorship, and government overreach. Like the divided
Justices on the Roberts Court, the lawyers profiled in this Essay assert that
the stakes involved in campaign finance regulation are enormous, but they
embrace incompatible visions of how the issues should be resolved. Their
competing visions appear to show not only differences in how the lawyers
deploy language and frames to advance their clients’ positions but also a
deep divide between their worldviews, reflecting the contrasting
perspectives of the polarized elites of which the lawyers (and Justices) are a
part. 177
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